Bush the Conservative p. 1
Introduction
A whole body of literature has developed around the idea that the politically elite have highly coherent and well-formed ideologies while masses are much less ideological (Berry, et. al., 1998; Jennings, 1992; Kritzer, 1978). In a democracy where these same ideological elites must convince non-ideological masses to support them in periodic elections, this presents a problem. How does a candidate make an ideological argument to someone who is ideologically illiterate?
Fully answering this question would require a forum much larger than this paper can provide. For one thing, political scientists cannot even agree upon what ideology means (Gerring, 1992). That poses a second puzzle of how can it be possible to identify which groups are and aren’t ideologically developed when no agreement can be found on what exactly it would mean if they are? As intellectually interesting as this puzzle may appear, it is simply beyond the bounds of this paper. Therefore, a somewhat arbitrary choice must be made about which definition to use in order to explore the first puzzle.
The definition used here is one lifted from Mostafa Rejai’s (1976) review of Nannerl O. Keohane’s “Philosophy, Theory, and Ideology” (1976): “Political ideology consists of a system of beliefs that is held as a matter of emotional commitment and habitual reinforcement.” While there are certainly aspects of ideology that will be left out of the discussion because of this definition, it at least provides a guidepost for exploring the more pertinent question of how elites use ideology as a tool for managing popular support. The result, for this paper, is that the determination of what is or is not an ideological statement is dependent on the individual evaluation of the researcher.
Go on to Page 2
A whole body of literature has developed around the idea that the politically elite have highly coherent and well-formed ideologies while masses are much less ideological (Berry, et. al., 1998; Jennings, 1992; Kritzer, 1978). In a democracy where these same ideological elites must convince non-ideological masses to support them in periodic elections, this presents a problem. How does a candidate make an ideological argument to someone who is ideologically illiterate?
Fully answering this question would require a forum much larger than this paper can provide. For one thing, political scientists cannot even agree upon what ideology means (Gerring, 1992). That poses a second puzzle of how can it be possible to identify which groups are and aren’t ideologically developed when no agreement can be found on what exactly it would mean if they are? As intellectually interesting as this puzzle may appear, it is simply beyond the bounds of this paper. Therefore, a somewhat arbitrary choice must be made about which definition to use in order to explore the first puzzle.
The definition used here is one lifted from Mostafa Rejai’s (1976) review of Nannerl O. Keohane’s “Philosophy, Theory, and Ideology” (1976): “Political ideology consists of a system of beliefs that is held as a matter of emotional commitment and habitual reinforcement.” While there are certainly aspects of ideology that will be left out of the discussion because of this definition, it at least provides a guidepost for exploring the more pertinent question of how elites use ideology as a tool for managing popular support. The result, for this paper, is that the determination of what is or is not an ideological statement is dependent on the individual evaluation of the researcher.
Go on to Page 2
© 2004 by Xpatriated Texan
<< Home